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Marketers seek new ways of gaining attention in our age of information bombardment, and one popular way has been to utilize schema-
incongruent language. The present article investigates how a common situational factor–consumer mood–influences consumers' ability to process
incongruent information in an information overload environment. Two experiments find positive mood increases (and negative mood decreases)
consumers' ability to respond to incongruent information. Both experiments utilize computer reaction tests on healthy adult consumers; the first
uses the Stroop test, the second uses the IAT (Implicit Association Test). This article discusses the implications of the findings for marketers
attempting to gain consumers attention as well as the theoretical implications for the growing research on consumer mood and processing.
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About 1500 advertising messages touch consumers each day.
The number keeps rising as marketers find new ways to reach
consumers through text messaging, the iPod, etc. (Rosen, 2002).
In order to break through the clutter, some theorists have
suggested that advertisers use incongruent information (i.e.,
information not consistent with one's expectations) in order to
attract attention and ensure more profound message processing
(Lee, 2000). For instance, Chrysler uses a German Dr. Z (also
their CEO) to promote its car's engineering which is quite
different from the company's traditional all-American image;
Marlboro and other cigarette companies seek to change their
negative image through public service campaigns aimed at
reducing adolescent smoking behavior; Wal-mart promotes its
addition of organic products to make the company seem “green”
and community-friendly. In all of those examples the companies
are trying to change their image by adding attributes or features
not usually associated with their product or company. The danger⁎ Corresponding author.
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can lead to consumer confusion, and even cause consumers to
tune out the message (Mitchell and Papavassiliou, 1999).
Adding to this scenario is the fact that consumers' mood at the
time they receivemarketers' messages can greatly influence how
that information is processed. Forgas (1995) proposes that
mood can influence consumer judgments in two ways: first, the
mood state can be used as information (which would lead to
mood congruent judgments); second, the mood state can
influence the judgment process itself. Marketers can manipulate
moods through the use of colors, smells, type of programming in
which messages are placed, etc., but which consumer mood state
best handles processing of marketing stimuli in an overload
situation? The literature is not entirely clear on this issue.
The goal of this research is to better understand how
consumer mood influences processing of congruent and
incongruent information in an information overload environ-
ment. The present article first defines “information overload”
and reviews prior research investigations. Then the difference
between schema congruent and incongruent information and
relevant research are discussed. The differing views of the effect
of mood-state on processing ability are then presented. The
experiments are designed to test how quickly consumers arey, and overload. J Bus Res (2007), doi:10.1016/j.jbusres.2007.04.003
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overload situation. In the first experiment the Stroop task
measures the speed with which consumers respond when
encountering congruent and incongruent information at a very
fast pace. In the second experiment the Implicit Association Test
(IAT, see Greenwald and Banaji, 1995) is used to measure how
quickly consumers are able to categorize information that is
congruently (or incongruently) valenced with a brand. Also
included is a discussion of the implications of the results for
those interested in the increasing problem of overload as well as
how the research findings fit and expand existing knowledge of
how mood affects consumer processing.
2. Background
2.1. Information overload
Early research in marketing (Jacoby, 1977) proposes that
there are finite limits to human beings' abilities to assimilate and
process information in a data-rich environment. The concern at
that time was that as more and more brands entered the
marketplace and more and more attributes were introduced,
consumers would no longer be able to effectively make quality
decisions in such an environment. Indeed, most research found
evidence that increasing the number of alternatives or attributes
in a choice set led to a decline in the quality of consumers'
choices (see Keller and Staelin, 1987).
Almost thirty years later, that 1970s media environment
looks almost simplistic compared to the one facing consumers
in the 21st century, but the underlying concern about consumers
and their ability to make quality decision remains. More recent
research suggests that studies of information overload should
not only consider the demands of the task but also consider the
information processing system that deals with the incoming
information. Of great interest is whether consumers can exercise
executive control over the incoming information or will be
overwhelmed completely (Hahn et al., 1992). Researchers have
found that decision makers adapt decision strategies to the
information environment (Payne et al., 1988) where in some
cases they may rely on deeper processing strategies and in other
cases simplify with a heuristic processing strategy.
The research on information overload and decisionmaking has
produced inconsistent results (Malhotra et al., 1982). In order to
explain some of the inconsistencies found in prior research,
researchers have differentiated between task factors, that is the
number of attributes and alternative choices, and context factors,
which include the things having to do with how the information
type and structure. The only situational context variable that has
been considered thus far in the information overload literature has
been time pressure (Hahn et al., 1992) and these findings revealed
time pressure reduced decision quality as well.
2.2. Schema congruent vs. incongruent information
Schemas are representations of previous experience that
guide action, perception and thought (Mandler, 1982). When a
consumer encounters a brand it is evaluated against an existingPlease cite this article as: Braun-LaTour KA et al. Mood, information congruencschema and that schema determines the understanding and
organization of the environment. According to Mandler, when
new information presented is congruent with one's existing
schema, processing is easy and comprehension is high. When
information is incongruent with one's existing schema, it is
challenging to comprehend and additional mental activity is
required (Meyers-Levy and Tybout, 1989).
There are many advantages for a brand using incongruent
information in its communication strategy. For instance,
incongruent information can lead to more careful processing
(Sujan et al., 1986; Lee, 2000); incongruent information can
make a brand “stand out” (Dahlen and Lange, 2004) because it
is novel and enhances arousal (Lee and Mason 1999) or because
it may induce curiosity (Muehling and Lazniak, 1988);
incongruent information can increase memorability of adver-
tising (Heckler and Childers, 1992) and enhance ad/brand
attitudes (Lee and Mason, 1999) partly because it can increase
message involvement (Lee, 2000), viewing time and elabora-
tion (Goodstein, 1993). On the other hand, congruent
information is more automatically understood and more often
seen as relevant (Kamins and Gupta, 1994) because it matches
expectations (Nedungadi and Hutchinson, 1985).
Within an information overload situation, schema congruent
information would be easier for consumers to process when
their cognitive capacity is diminished. However, that ease of
processing may lead to messages being overlooked or ignored,
so advertisers recently have been urged to use more incongruent
information as the advertising environment becomes more
cluttered (Lee, 2000).
2.3. Mood states and processing
2.3.1. Definition
In the psychological and marketing literature, a “mood”
generally refers to an affective state that is less intense and more
diffused than an “emotion” (Isen, 1984). Mood states are con-
tinuously shifting and even small shifts have been found to exert
great influence on consumer behavior (Gardner, 1985). Research
has identified a broad range of specific moods such as sadness and
anxiety (Raghunathan and Pham, 1999), but mood states can also
be grouped in more general or global categories such as positive,
neutral and negative (Clark and Isen, 1982) though some
researchers argue that such categorization is a vast oversimplifi-
cation (Belk, 1984). Studies of positive mood have generally
produced more consistent effects than negative mood (Moore and
Isen, 1990) and for the purposes of this study, negative mood is
operationalized as an affective state similar to sadness and positive
mood is operationalized as an affective state similar to happiness.
2.3.2. The traditional view of mood on processing
Forgas (1991, p. 15) summarizes the traditional (or prevailing)
view of the role mood has on decision making: “Several studies
indicate that when facing a problem-solving task in a positive
mood, people tend to reach a decision more quickly, use less
information, tend to avoid demanding, systematic processing of
the information, and aremore confident of their decisions (Forgas,
1989; Isen, 1984; Isen and Means, 1983). Unfortunately,y, and overload. J Bus Res (2007), doi:10.1016/j.jbusres.2007.04.003
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consequences of dysphoric or negative affect states, and what
evidence exists suggests a rather complex reaction to dysphoria
(Forgas, 1989).” And consistent with this view, Schwarz and
Bless (1991, p. 56) offer the following with regard to the role of
negative mood: “We suggest that people in negative moods are
likely to elicit an analytical mode of information processing that is
characterized by considerable attention to detail, careful, step-by-
step analysis of the available information, and a high degree of
logical consistency, although probably associated with a lack of
creativity. Accordingly, they are likely to improve performance on
tasks that require analytic processing, but performance on
creativity-related tasks is typically impaired.”
2.3.3. Changing views of mood on processing
The original view was that positive mood places a high
cognitive load on decision-making, which leads to greater
reliance on heuristics (Worth and Mackie, 1987). However, new
research debunks that theory. For instance, an experiment
designed to demonstrate decreased performance under a positive
mood state, finds that those in a positive mood actually
outperformed sad mood participants on a task thought to impose
a “cognitive load” (distraction task, Bless et al., 1996). In fact, the
research on depression (which could be thought of as a chronic
sad state) has found that depression interferes with effortful
processing. This interference view of depression has been
supported by research studying the performance of depressed
and non-depressed participants on intellectual, general learning
and problem-solving tasks (Hartlage et al., 1993). This
interference, they argue, may be due to a reduction of cognitive
capacity and a narrowing of attentional focus.
Several of the researchers who originally proposed that
positive mood makes consumers “mindless,” have found that
happy people were able to switch processing depending on the
situation, in some instances using their greater flexibility to
process information at a deeper level (Ruder and Bless, 2003).
Isen and her colleagues have conducted the most thorough
research in the area of positive mood and its role in information
processing (though it should be noted that the majority of this
research compares positive to neutral rather than negativemoods).
These researchers have shown that positive mood leads to a rich
cognitive context that improves integration of information,
problem solving, decision making, and cognitive organization
in a wide variety of settings (Isen, 2000). Clore et al (2001)
suggest that if the environment calls for it, the flexibility of those
in a positive mood state should enhance consumers' ability to
switch processing strategies. Forgas' (1995) Affect Infusion
Model (AIM) states that mood should play the most influence on
processing in situations that require high versus low constructive
processing, as in the information overload environment.
3. Designing an information overload environment
Much of the early research on information overload was a
debate as to how to best measure “quality of decision” as that
can be a rather subjective task (e.g., Jacoby, 1977). In this
research we propose that rather than looking at the decisionPlease cite this article as: Braun-LaTour KA et al. Mood, information congruencoutcome–choice–looking at the ability of consumers to react to
and process different types of information can provide insight
into how well consumers fare in an overload situation.
Information overload refers to the variety of stimuli (in type
and number) to which the receiver must attend (Jacoby, 1977).
In addition, the issue of responding to time pressure is also
important (Hahn et al., 1992) in the fast-paced consumer world
where information is continuously received. The present
experiments were designed to focus on mood's impact on
processing congruent and incongruent information. According
to a recent review, one of the most powerful and useful tools for
studying automatic processes in judgment and choice is
response-latency analysis (Fitzsimons et al., 2002). Faster
reaction times reveal consumers are more efficient in their
judgments, while slower reaction times demonstrate consumers
are having a more difficult time coming to a decision. In the
present study, if consumers are faster/slower in the completion
of their tasks as a function of mood state, it can be assumed that
their processing stimuli were enhanced/hindered by the mood-
induction. Furthermore, unlike more conventional tools such as
questionnaires, response latency measurements have the
advantage of being less susceptible to consumers' beliefs,
expectations or issues of social desirability.
The objective was to choose tasks that tap consumers'
executive functioning to investigate mood's effect on processing.
Ashby et al. (1999) propose that positive moods result in
increased dopamine levels, particularly in the prefrontal cortex
and anterior cingulate. Specifically, it seems higher levels of
dopamine are associated with greater flexibility in cognitive
thought suggesting a mechanism for the relationship between
positive mood and flexible thinking. The cortical areas implicated
in both positive and negative mood states are also involved with
higher-order decision making, such as executive functioning.
Such executive functioning is thought to be important in the
control of thoughts and actions, such as planning, problem
solving, trouble shooting, and performing novel tasks (e.g.,
Cabeza and Nyberg, 2000). This executive control would seem
necessary when processing information that is incongruent with
existing schemas.
The Stroop task was especially well suited to the research
question. It is thought to tap into basic operations of cognition,
offering clues to the fundamental process of attention and
executive control (Stroop, 1935; MacLeod, 1991). Further, the
Stroop task has been labeled by many researchers as a “frontal
lobe” test because of its relationship to higher-order decision
processes and it seems to activate those areas of the brain
involved in both higher-order function and affect. Cabeza and
Nyberg (2000) reviewed the positron emission tomography
(PET) results of Stroop task performance and found significant
activation in the prefrontal cortex and anterior cingulate, the
areas of the brain thought to be influenced by mood.
Surprisingly, though, only one study has assessedmood effects
on the classic Stroop task. Phillips et al. (2002) looked at per-
formance between positive and neutral mood-induced participants
on several variations of the test. They predicted, but found no
difference between mood conditions, though the direction of their
results indicated positive mood was faster than the neutral group.y, and overload. J Bus Res (2007), doi:10.1016/j.jbusres.2007.04.003
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participants think and discuss either a very positive event or
discussing a “typical” Monday (they did not consider negative
mood). Mood was assessed three times during the study: once at
the beginning, once after the induction, and then again after the
Stroop test. Mood differences had dissipated after the Stroop test,
suggesting the induction procedure was not particularly robust. In
addition, there are concerns that having participants rate theirmood
state so often within an experiment may lead to demand effects.
Murry and Dacin (1996) have suggested videos may be more
appropriate for studying some marketing induced mood effects,
particularly when studying negative moods. Therefore the present
experiments manipulate mood with mood-inducing videos.
IAT was used in the second experiment to assess how
consumers respond to incongruencies between brand and valence.
In a typical IAT there are two critical conditions: a “congruent”
combination where one categorizes a positive/negative subject
with similar positive/negative attributes; and an “incongruent”
combination where one has to group a positive/negative subject
with dissimilar adjectives. In the incongruent condition, partici-
pants must suppress the natural urge to categorize the subject with
its properly valenced attribute which is a similar experience to that
in the Stroop task inwhich the participantmust disregard the color
word and identify the ink color. This incongruent condition is
more difficult and requires more processing capacities (Sherman
et al., 1998). The congruent information trials, meanwhile, are
able to benefit from existing schemas or stereotypes and past
knowledge structures which free up more attentional resources.
The application of the IAT has been quite different from the
Stroop task. However, there are some important parallels between
the two tests. Indeed, a recent neuroimagining study found that the
IAT racial bias/stereotype was associated with brain activity in
regions thought to be critical to executive control (Richeson et al.,
2003). Though some researchers have found some context effects
on the IAT (e.g., Karpinski and Hilton, 2001) no one as yet has
specifically parsed out the responses to the incongruent and
congruent trials as a function of mood-state.
4. Predictions
Based on the schema congruency research we predict that
consumers' reaction times in categorizing congruent informa-
tion will be faster than when categorizing incongruent
information for both the Stroop and IAT tasks. As the decision
environment gets more complex, consumers will find it even
easier to process congruent rather than incongruent information.
According to Forgas (1995) mood will have the most influence
on processing in environments that require more extensive
processing so the first experiment separately considers
consumers' reactions when categorizing in a simple environ-
ment and in a more complex environment. We expect greater
differences to emerge in the latter situation.
Though there have been no specific studies on the role ofmood-
state on processing in an information overload environment, this
environment would qualify as consumers' needing more construc-
tive processing, especially in the case of encountering incongruent
information. There are several studies that suggest those in aPlease cite this article as: Braun-LaTour KA et al. Mood, information congruencpositive mood may be better able to deal with incongruent
information than those in other mood-states. First, researchers who
have studied positive mood's impact on variety seeking behavior
have found that consumers in a positive mood have a greater
awareness of the differences and/or multifaceted nature of the
stimuli and exhibit more switching behavior across alternatives
(Kahn and Isen, 1993). Second, studies have shown that consumers
in a positive mood tend to be less overwhelmed by tasks and show
less confusion and greater understanding and integration of issues
during the decision-making process (Isen, 2000). Third, research-
ers have found participants in a positive mood are more responsive
to instructions to find similarities or differences in categorizing
products and exhibit more cognitive flexibility (Murray et al,
1990). Therefore, it is reasonable to believe that this enhanced
cognitive capacity and efficient processing of consumers in a
positive mood would extend to the information overload situation
(despite the fact that traditional research in this area would predict
the opposite). Specifically it is predicted that those in a positive
mood (compared to neutral or negative mood) will be faster at
categorizing information in both the Stroop and IAT tasks. Because
the congruent information relies on heuristic processing rather than
the more constructive processing of incongruent information, one
might expect greater differences in mood-states in reaction times
for the incongruent trials.
Last, in order to explore the mood-as-information and mood-
as-process relationship, in the second experiment the relation-
ship between the IAT effect (an implicit measure of attitude) and
explicitly stated attitudes toward the brands is investigated. The
mood-as-information theory would predict a mood-congruent
response on brand attitude measures, where brands are rated
more favorably in the positive mood condition (compared to the
neutral or negative mood conditions, Gardner, 1985). Prior
research has found a positive relationship between implicit and
explicit attitude measures (Isen et al., 2004) in research where a
positive mood induction occurred. There has not been any
research on the correspondence of implicit and explicit attitude
measures with a negative (sad) mood, and since there is less
consistency in the negative mood research (Moore and Isen,
1990), this issue is more exploratory.
5. Experiment 1: Stroop task
The classic Stroop test is delivered to participants on a
computer in both simple and complex conditions. In the simple
condition, the participant identifies the color of the ink with just
one type of stimuli, receiving all congruent ink and color words,
or all incongruent ink and color words. In the complex condition,
the participant receives randomly both congruent and incongruent
color words and ink. The complex condition is similar to what
consumers receive in an information overload environment. It
should place more emphasis on executive functioning and
highlight participants' ability to “switch” processing.
5.1. Participants
Eighty eastern university undergraduates, 50 female and 30
male, with an average age of twenty-one, participated in thisy, and overload. J Bus Res (2007), doi:10.1016/j.jbusres.2007.04.003
Table 1
Experiment 1 Stroop Reaction Times
Simple environment Complex environment
Mood Congruent Incongruent Congruent Incongruent
Positive 1202 ms 1310 ms 1041 ms 1167 ms
Neutral 1226 ms 1364 ms 1144 ms 1270 ms
Negative 1235 ms 1449 ms 1091 ms 1422 ms
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Stroop task before or were colorblind.
5.2. Design
A mixed levels design was employed with a between factor 3
(mood: positive, neutral, negative) and within factor of
information type 2 (information: congruent, incongruent) and
fixedwithin factor 2 (environment: simple, complex). Participants
were randomly assigned to one of the three mood conditions.
5.3. Procedure
Participants came to a computer lab and were told that they
would be doing some tasks on the computer, but first were to
view a video. Depending upon their experimental condition,
they saw one of three twenty minute videos: the positive or
“happy” mood-induction group saw a comedy routine by Bill
Cosby and a clip from Jim Carrey's movie Liar, Liar; the neutral
mood-induction group viewed a documentary about Einstein,
and the negative (sad) mood-induction group viewed a clip from
the movie Steel Magnolias, taken from a critical scene where
Julia Robert's character dies and her mother, played by Sally
Field, has a breakdown at the funeral. These mood-induction
videos had been pre-tested to ensure the elicitation of the proper
mood-state (Puccinelli, 2000).
Participants were told that they would be answering some
questions about the video but they were to clear their immediate
memory with some other tasks. Participants were directed to
their computers and started the Stroop task. In this version of the
task we had six different ink colors and color words: red, blue,
green, yellow, orange and purple. The first two trials were in the
more simple condition: the first block of trials had them indicate
the first letter of the ink color for stimuli in which the color word
and ink matched by pushing the appropriate button on the
keypad (congruent). The second block of trials had them
identify the first letter of the ink color where the ink and word
did not match (the Stroop condition, incongruent). Again, there
were six exposures of incongruent ink colors and words. The
third block of trials had them identify the first letter of the ink
color in a more complex condition: they received either
congruent or incongruent color words and ink for a total of
twenty-four word/ink combinations. The stimulus order was
randomized within each block of trials and fixed the order of
trials across conditions: the simple condition always preceded
the more complex condition. Each block of trials consisted of
six stimulus items.
6. Results
Based on previous research, only reaction times from cor-
rect trials were used for analysis (Phillips et al., 2002). A 2
(information type: congruent vs. incongruent)×2 (environment:
simple vs. complex)×3 (mood: positive, negative, neutral)
mixed-model ANOVA was performed with information type
and environment as within factors and mood effect as between
factor. The dependent measure was the speed in categorizing thePlease cite this article as: Braun-LaTour KA et al. Mood, information congruencinformation. There was a main effect of environment, F(1,77)=
19.35, pb .0001, information type, F(1,77)=65.76, pb .0001.
There was a marginal effect of mood, F(2,76)=2.76, p=.07.
However, the variables mood and information type interacted,
F(2,76)=5.57, p= .006. None of the other interactions reached
significance.
A separate 2×3 ANOVA was then computed because
different responses based on the environment were expected,
where more constructive processing and therefore more
influence of mood-state would occur in the more complex,
overload situation. Means by condition appear in Table 1. For
the simple condition, the ANOVA revealed a main effect of
information type, F(1,77)=33.91, pb .0001, which illustrates
that the participants responded faster to congruent information
(M=1211 ms) than to incongruent information (M=1375 ms).
However, there was no main effect of mood and no interaction
effect (F'sb1.50, p'sN .23), suggesting, consistent with Forgas
(1995), that this more simple task did not constitute one where
mood would exert differences in processing.
As the environment became more complex, positive mood
began to exert more effect on ability to deal with incongruent
information. A separate 2×3 ANOVA revealed an interaction
between information type and mood, F(2,76)=6.51, p=.002.
Means are also in Table 1. Post hoc tests (Bonferroni) revealed
that the negative mood condition was significantly slower
(p=.012) than the positive mood conditions. Additionally, a
main effect for type of information was found, where overall
participants were faster (M=1089 ms) in the congruent than
incongruent condition (M=1288 ms), F(1,76)=50.23, pb .0001.
Mood was also found to be a significant factor, F(2,76)=4.54,
p=.014. The mood factor was qualified by the interaction: there
was only a difference between groups when the information type
was incongruent. This therefore suggests that the incongruent
information become more difficult to process in the overload
environment and that those in a positive mood were best able to
handle that more extensive processing.
7. Discussion
The results of this study suggest that mood-states can make a
difference in how consumers process incongruent information in
an overload situation. Participants in the negative mood
condition were significantly slower than the other mood
conditions when encountering incongruent information, partic-
ularly in the more complex “overload” situation. Researchers
have suggested that if the task calls for it, those in a positive
mood-state may be able to “step up to the plate” and expand their
processing ability (Ruder and Bless, 2003) which is consistent
with what we found here as there was no differences acrossy, and overload. J Bus Res (2007), doi:10.1016/j.jbusres.2007.04.003
Fig. 1. Experiment 2 IAT.
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congruent with Forgas' research (1995 AIM).
While the difference in the Stroop task performance provides
some insight into the differences between mood-states in global
executive functioning and ability to process incongruent
information, a concern for consumer researchers is when
these effects will appear in “real world” consumer tasks.
Therefore, in the next experiment well-known brand names
rather than colors are used n a computer reaction time test. The
researchers were also interested in whether mood's influence on
processing would be related to mood's role as information
(resulting in mood-congruent judgments).
8. Experiment 2: the Implicit Association Test
In this version of the IAT two well-established brands, Ben &
Jerry's and Marlboro, are the focus. Pilot research on these two
brands found each brand to be stereotypically thought of as the
“good” (Ben & Jerry's) and the “bad” (Marlboro) brand. In this
pretest four participants were asked to “please indicate how you
feel about each the following brands.” For each of the brands,
they rated how “positive” and “negative” each brand made them
feel on a 9-point scale ranging from “not at all” to “extremely.” In
addition to Ben & Jerry's and Marlboro, these participants rated
the following nine brands: Coca-Cola, Crest, Firestone, General
Motors, Levi Strauss, McDonald's, Microsoft, Nabisco and
Philip Morris. To check that there were no other brands that
participants felt more strongly about, they were asked to list any
additional brands about which they felt very positively or
negatively. No brand surfaced across all participants and those
that were listed were not rated as extremely as Ben & Jerry's or
Marlboro. The two unipolar ratings (i.e.,positive and negative)
were combined to form a single Positive composite (alpha= .75).
The results found that Ben & Jerry's was rated highest on the
Positive composite and Marlboro the lowest. Moreover, the two
differed significantly (M=7.63 vs. 2.63, t(3)=8.16, pb .01).
In the main experiment the congruent trials involved pairing
Ben & Jerry's with positive adjectives and Marlboro with
negative adjectives. The incongruent trials involved pairing Ben
& Jerry's with negative adjectives and Marlboro with positive
adjectives. These critical trials were in an environment similar
to the “complex” one from Experiment 1 where they received
both types of information at a very fast pace.
8.1. Participants
Thirty-two (18 female, 14 male, average age of 22) par-
ticipants from the Cambridge Massachusetts area were paid for
their participation in the study.
8.2. Procedure
Participants were shown one of the same three videos from
the first experiment to induce either a positive, negative or
neutral mood. Each participant was run in a separate session.
After viewing the video they received instructions about the IAT
test, and were told that they would be categorizing a series ofPlease cite this article as: Braun-LaTour KA et al. Mood, information congruencstimuli and were given a set of practice trials to get accustomed
to the IAT procedure. Participants were presented with blocks of
either words (e.g., joy, happiness, murder, death) or images (e.g.,
a pint of ChunkyMonkey) and asked to categorize each based on
the instructions for the given trial using the specified keys on a
computer keyboard. The participants then completed the IAT
test, with the critical trials being ones where they had to
categorize Ben & Jerry's with positive attributes and Marlboro
with negative attributes (congruent trial) and one where they had
to categorize Ben & Jerry's with negative attributes and
Marlboro with positive attributes (incongruent trial). It is
important to note that for half of the participants the keys were
switched (i.e., positive words for the right key and negative
words for the left key) and order of the test conditions (congruent
and incongruent) was counterbalanced across participants.
To assess participants' explicit attitudes toward each of the
brands, they were asked to rate each brand on a range of
dimensions. Theywere given a series of semantic differentials on a
visual analog scale, asked to indicate their feelings toward the
brands, and indicate their willingness to pay for products featuring
the brands' logos. These ratings were combined into two
composites, one for each of the brands for the analysis that follows.
9. Results
All reported p-values are two-tailed. A 2 (information type:
congruent vs. incongruent)×3 (mood: positive, negative, neutral)
mixed-model ANOVA was performed with information type as
within factors and mood effect as between factor. There was an
effect of information, F(2,29)=33.62, pb .0001, which illustrates
the IAT effect indicating that participants responded faster to
congruent combinations, consistent with research finding sche-
ma-congruent information is easier to process. Fig. 1 also illus-
trates that the information type interacted with mood, F(2,29)=
3.63, pb .05. The response times were longest for those
consumers who were in the negative mood condition when they
had to process incongruent information, which is consistent with
the findings from the first experiment. Contrasts between the
mood-states were computed for the two conditions separately and
the only difference between the negative and positive mood that
was statistically significant was in the incongruent combination,
contrast t=2.21, p=.05. The response times for the neutraly, and overload. J Bus Res (2007), doi:10.1016/j.jbusres.2007.04.003
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mood conditions. There is no effect of mood manipulation when
the consumers had to process the congruent trials. The ANOVA
revealed no overall effect of mood, F(2,29)=1.33, p=.28.
As an initial analysis of the explicit measures, a 2 (brand: Ben
& Jerry's, Marlboro)×3 (mood: positive, neutral or negative)
mixed-model ANOVAwas computed with brand as within factor
and mood effect as between factor. Consistent with pretests,
participants in this sample hadmore positive attitudes toward Ben
& Jerry's compared to Marlboro F(1, 41)=236.64, pb .001.
Further, a marginal effect of mood condition found a mood
congruence effect of mood condition on attitudes such that
participants in a positive condition reported the most positive
attitudes and those in the negative condition the least positive
attitudes F(2, 41)=2.21, pb .15 which is consistent with the
mood-as-information hypothesis.
To examine the correspondence of these explicit attitudes
(mood-as-information) and the IAT effect (mood as influencing
processing), a difference score between the two brand
composites was calculated. While the process measure (the
IATeffect) turned out to be highly predictive of explicit attitudes
for positive mood participants (r= .66, pb .05), an implicit
measure actually predicted a tendency in the opposite direction
among negative mood consumers (r=−.63, p=.067).
10. Discussion
These results are consistent with those found in Experiment
1: negative mood participants needed more time to process
incongruent information than positive mood participants and
somewhat more time than neutral participants. Note in neither
study was there a significant difference in mood-state on the
processing of congruent information, which would indicate
greater or lesser usage of heuristic processing. Nor was there an
overall dampening due to the negative mood. It appears that
those in a negative mood are not slower overall in their
processing, just when the information to be processed is
incongruent and involves more extensive cognitive effort.
The difference between the mood's influence on processing
the congruent and incongruent information and mood's
influence on explicitly stated attitudes for the brands are
additional results. Negative mood appears to result in an implicit
and explicit knowledge clash; a result different from findings
when looking at positive mood on these measures—where
correspondence results (e.g., Isen et al., 2004). In the positive
mood condition, the results show that the IAT effect was
positively correlated with the attitudes the participants reported
explicitly. The stronger the individual difference between the
processing of congruent and incongruent information (see the
vertical offset in Fig. 1 for the mean) the more the participants
reported positive attitudes toward Ben & Jerry's (being the
stereotypically “good” brand in this experiment). Despite the
fact that the IAT effect was more pronounced for the negative
mood condition (see the difference between congruent and
incongruent information processing in Fig. 1), there was no such
correlation with the explicitly reported attitudes. If at all, there
was a slight tendency in the opposite direction. This resultPlease cite this article as: Braun-LaTour KA et al. Mood, information congruencdemonstrates how mood can influence the relation between
implicit and explicit measures and thus entails important
methodological considerations for future research.
11. General discussion and implications
In two experiments it was found that incongruent informa-
tion is more difficult for consumers to process when in a
negative rather than a positive mood in an information overload
environment. In both studies the “neutral” participants fell
somewhere between the positive and negative mood partici-
pants. The implications are discussed below.
11.1. Implications for overload
The fact that mood-state can be used as information for
consumer decision-making is not new. What is new is that one's
mood can influence the ability of the consumer to attend to, and
use certain information in an information overload environment.
Because one of the remedy's to “break through” the information
clutter is to present communications that are incongruent with
expectations, it is important to understand how mood-state
influences that type of discrepant information. More generally,
incorporating incongruent information is one way in which
brands evolve and reposition themselves in the marketplace.
Both experiments find processing incongruent information is
more difficult for those in a negativemood-state. This implies that
if marketers suspect that a consumer is in a negative mood, due to
a cold, product failure, or watching a sad TV program, or any
other reason, they should expect consumers to process incongru-
ent information in a slower, more deliberate fashion than under
other circumstances. Therefore, marketers should consider using
congruent or reinforcing campaigns when approaching consu-
mers in a sad state. For consumers in a positive mood, marketers
can use that mood to introduce more complex varieties of their
products, or get consumers to elaborate on their products more
deeply, or change positioning strategies.
11.2. Implications for mood/consumer research
The present state of the role of positive mood on decision-
making seems to be that in some simple tasks, such as when
stereotypes or scripts can be employed, people in a positive mood
will rely on those heuristics. However, for tasks that require
greater elaboration, positive mood might enhance decision
making, e.g. seeing the creative solution to a problem. In the
past there has been some difficulty in making the comparative
statement between positive and negative mood-states, however,
because those who do study the beneficial role of positive mood
normally compare their findings to a neutral control group, rather
than a negative or sad group while those finding a detrimental
effect of positive mood generally compare their results to those in
negative (sad)mood-states. The present research suggests that it is
important to consider both positive and negative moods. In
addition this research suggests that positive mood may enhance
and negative mood hinder cognitive capacity and relational
processing in an information rich environment.y, and overload. J Bus Res (2007), doi:10.1016/j.jbusres.2007.04.003
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The present report focuses on “sad” mood and other negative
mood-states that may lead to different findings. Because
information overload relates with feelings of anxiousness and
stress, future research should investigate how that more natural
occurring mood-state influences consumers' decision processes.
Because the tasks were done in controlled lab environments, the
choice of tuning out or avoiding marketers' information was not
available (which is a common result in overload situations). Also,
because different mood-induction techniques might produce
different results (Gardner, 1985), future research should consider
varying the induction techniques to get a more robust
understanding of mood's influence on processing.
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